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Thirty-six years ago, Tom Jackson suggested that corporate bankruptcy 
law can best be explained and defended as the terms of an implicit bargain 
among creditors.1 This assertion is founded on a belief that creditors, as a 
group, prefer bankruptcy’s collective process to a grab race among themselves, 
particularly when such a race may cause the demise of a viable going concern. 
Since Jackson’s article, scholars have discussed and debated whether 
creditors need to rely on bankruptcy’s bargain for collective action. Some 
have contended that creditors could in fact contractually arrange for a 
collective process and that the law should permit them to do so. Others have 
argued that the impediments to such a contractual arrangement would be too 
daunting. With rare exception, though, participants in this dialogue assumed 
that creditors desire some form of collective process, whether provided by 
statute or contract. That is, while implementation was debated, the 
collectivization premise went mostly unchallenged. 
The recent transformation of the bankruptcy process from a forum of 
reorganization to, largely, an auction block further supports the 
collectivization premise. A collective process may not seem attractive when it 
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features the contests inherent in reorganization, described colorfully by Sol 
Stein as a feast for lawyers.2 But the bankruptcy process may appear in a more 
favorable light when it is used simply to conduct an orderly sale of the 
debtor’s assets, including a sale as a going concern if that configuration of 
assets garners the highest bid. 
All may seem well, then, in the world of bankruptcy, where the apparent 
confluence of theory and practice led Douglas Baird and Robert Rasmussen 
to declare the end of bankruptcy,3 by which they meant that bankruptcy has 
evolved to its ideal. But there is a fly in the ointment. 
At a series of recent conferences attended by academics and practitioners, 
the latter have suggested, sometimes expressly, that if freed from legal 
constraint, creditors they know would not only contract out of bankruptcy 
but out of any collective proceeding. That is, at least some practicing 
lawyers—presumably not immersed in Jacksonian orthodoxy—seem to 
believe that their clients would like to engage in a grab race after all, 
consequences be damned. 
Do these lawyers, who represent sophisticated lenders, simply mean that 
their clients favor a competition in which they would occupy a privileged 
position? Perhaps. But this seems unlikely because in a functioning capital 
market, creditors are mere stakeholders who are forced by the market to pay 
for any privilege in the form of lower interest rates. Sophisticated lenders, 
along with their lawyers, well understand this. 
But perhaps a better explanation for why lenders might forgo collectivization 
exists: debtors would insist on interest rates possible only if the debtor obtained 
funds within a capital structure designed to throw the firm to the creditor wolves 
in the event of an uncured default. This conjecture is not new. I first raised the 
idea years ago in dissent to the collectivist hegemony. What is new, and the focus 
of this Article, is the extent to which the conjecture is supported by recent 
developments in bankruptcy practice and creditor activism. 
I. THE CREDITORS’ IMPLICIT BARGAIN 
On the desirability of collective action, almost all were Jacksonians once, 
myself included. In an article I wrote some years ago,4 I invoked Thomas 
Jackson to explain that, at its core, bankruptcy serves creditors as a group 
when it supplants individual creditor debt collection remedies with a 
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“collective debt-collection device.”5 In theory, as I said then, bankruptcy’s 
collectivized proceeding is superior to individual creditor actions because 
individual creditors have perverse incentives to act in their own interests, 
even if those interests disserve the creditors’ collective interest. Thus, I joined 
the consensus that bankruptcy is beneficial to the extent it protects creditors 
from their own worst instincts. 
 To elaborate slightly, assume a debtor firm operates a business worth 
more as a going concern than if its assets were sold piecemeal. That is, the 
assets are worth more as parts of the debtor’s business than they are 
distributed separately to become parts of other businesses. Assume further 
that the debtor is subject to obligations even greater than the value of the 
firm as a going concern and that the debtor is in default on those obligations. 
The debtor has insufficient assets to pay all creditors in full, so each creditor 
may have an incentive to collect on its debt before the debtor’s assets are 
depleted by other creditors’ collections. In the absence of bankruptcy law, a 
creditors’ race to the assets could divide those assets piecemeal, with each race 
winner taking a piece of the debtor large enough to satisfy its own claim. As 
a result, the creditors could take from the debtor assets worth in the aggregate 
only the piecemeal liquidation value. 
Foundational to the Jacksonian creditors’ bargain paradigm is that, without 
bankruptcy law, a potentially destructive creditor grab race would be inevitable. 
The premise is that such a race—rather than an actual bargain among 
creditors—would occur because each creditor would know that it could be left 
without recourse to any assets if it delayed its own action on the mere hope that 
the creditors would both find one another and agree to act collectively. This 
presumed dilemma of coordination presents a collective action problem. 
Bankruptcy solves a creditors’ collective action problem by disallowing 
individual creditor action. A bankruptcy court supervises the use and 
disposition of the debtor’s assets and can hold the assets together to maximize 
their value. The court then divides the value of the assets among creditors in 
an orderly fashion, either through the sale of the assets to a third party and 
the distribution of sale proceeds or through the distribution of interests in a 
debtor freed from prebankruptcy obligations. In no instance does an 
individual creditor have an opportunity to withdraw vital assets unilaterally. 
In the illustration above, for example, the bankruptcy court would 
prohibit individual creditor action and could sell the debtor’s business as a 
going concern or distribute securities in the firm with an aggregate worth 
equal to the value of the firm as a going concern. This sale or distribution 
would thus preserve the debtor’s going-concern surplus. Such bankruptcy 
intervention is thought to reflect a hypothetical creditors’ bargain or the 
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solution the creditors would reach could they solve their coordination 
problems. Accordingly, bankruptcy’s solution to the collective action problem 
is the chief justification for its elimination of individual creditor remedies. 
Douglas Baird has summarized this analysis as follows: “[W]e may not desire 
a world without bankruptcy because the self-interest of creditors leads to a 
collective action problem, and a legal mechanism is needed to ensure that the 
self-interest of individuals does not run counter to the interests of the group.”6 
II. A CREDITORS’ EXPRESS BARGAIN 
Against this background, a number of scholars considered the possibility 
that creditors desirous of collective action need not rely on an implicit 
bargain. Rather, they might enter an actual bargain that deprived individual 
creditors of unilateral collection rights. Robert Rasmussen, for example, 
suggested that bankruptcy law could be adopted, or forgone, by a corporate 
debtor based on a selection from options in a federal register that he 
proposed.7 David Skeel suggested allowing states to draft their own 
insolvency laws applicable to companies incorporated under the laws of that 
state.8 My own proposal was that debtors could, possibly even under extant 
law, adopt a charter provision that foreswore the issuance of traditional debt, 
which would be replaced by investment instruments that I called Chameleon 
Equity. Such instruments would allow a firm to retain the benefits of debt’s 
fixed obligations with automatic—in today’s jargon “self-executing”—
conversion to debt on uncured default.9 
Whether ruled by a menu selection in a federal register, a debtor’s choice 
of state corporate law, or a charter provision applicable under the laws of any 
state, a creditor who loaned to a debtor subject to a particular set of insolvency 
rules could be deemed to have chosen a bargain reflected in those rules.10 And 
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while one might say that only the charter provision, which would restrict 
investment contracts to terms required by those provisions, could properly be 
labeled an actual bargain among creditors, with choice of law by the debtor 
imposed on creditors without actual assent, this would be a mere quibble. By 
contrast to a single federal bankruptcy rule that overrides any state law or 
charter provision, any method through which creditors can choose to extend 
credit under one set of rules or another can, for most purposes, be considered 
an actual bargain.11 
As I have observed previously in fleshing out how a contractual alternative 
to bankruptcy might look, it is useful to distinguish bankruptcy policy, by which 
I mean collective action policy, from issues of general concern. A tenet of the 
Jacksonian paradigm is that legal provisions directed to the latter need not be 
part of an insolvency regime. It follows that if there is no need for a legal 
mechanism to prevent a creditors’ grab race, there is no need for any sort of 
special insolvency regime. The contractual collective-action mechanism that I 
proposed, born of a thought experiment about a world without debt, suggests 
that there is no need for any legal mechanism beyond contract enforcement to 
ensure collective action, and thus, no need for corporate bankruptcy law or any 
special insolvency regime. 
Of course, the simplest contractual alternative to bankruptcy as an 
insolvency process is for firms to issue only common equity, which eliminates 
the possibility of insolvency, or to issue debt only to a single creditor, which 
eliminates any collective action problem among creditors. But it had long been 
believed that such a response to the risks of insolvency would be unworkable. 
A firm might rationally issue fixed obligations, even ignoring any potential tax 
benefits, because such obligations for some firms can allow managers to hold a 
significant portion of a firm’s residual claim and can for all firms subject 
managers to the consequences of payment default, including, perhaps, 
dismissal. The result could be more productive managers. A firm might 
rationally issue its fixed obligations to a large number of investors if no single 
lender would be willing to provide all financing at all times—as might be the 
case, or has been the case, for some large issuers. Or a firm might rationally 
prefer to have multiple financing sources so as not to vest in any lender the 
opportunity to behave strategically with respect to subsequent loans that only 
an existing lender, given better information, could efficiently provide. 
 With the assumption in mind that large firms would issue a 
significant amount of fixed obligations to multiple creditors, I imagined 
 
340 (“Ideally, nonconsensual claimants would have highest priority in any sort of firm.”). This point, 
however, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
11 For an analysis of any such bargain’s financial consequences, see generally Alan Schwartz, 
Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts, 36 J.L. & ECON. 595 (1993). 
1858 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 1853 
eliminating only a single feature of traditional debt: the right of an 
individual fixed-obligation claimant to collect. This one feature is 
significant because it is the feature of debt that creates the collective 
action problem and the need for bankruptcy reorganization law. 
 Firms that issue fixed obligations to multiple investors might benefit from 
a debt-free capital structure by avoiding the expense of financial 
restructuring, either through bankruptcy or other means. This expense can be 
significant when claimant negotiations deteriorate into an imbroglio, as they 
frequently did at the time that I first engaged in this thought experiment 
during the 1990s.12 Taking as given the desire to protect insolvent but viable 
firms, it is not clear that anything significant would be lost by eliminating 
collection rights. 
Elimination of debt, and with it the individual creditor’s right to collect, 
might cost little because there is an alternative collective remedy of which 
fixed-obligation claimants could avail themselves. I argued that a firm could, 
in principle, replace debt with a special variant of preferred equity. The 
Chameleon Equity firm that would result would retain the benefits of fixed 
obligations but would avoid the negative consequences of creditor 
coordination failure—notably postdefault dismemberment of a viable firm. 
In the simplest Chameleon Equity firm, if insolvency—defined as asset value 
less than fixed obligations—led to default, default would eliminate the 
preinsolvency common-equity class and would convert the lowest priority 
fixed-obligation class to common equity. Any remaining senior class would 
survive unaffected. At any given time, management would represent the 
firm’s current common-equity class. 
Significantly, even in a complex firm, one with a variety of fixed-obligation 
priorities, no court would have to preserve the higher obligations’ priority. The 
senior obligations would retain their priority because they would survive 
complete with fixed claims. This would free the firm to adopt a tiered hierarchy 
of priority classes that would keep the firm almost eternally solvent and almost 
eternally subject to significant fixed obligations. In the end, every claimant would 
get the priority for which it contracted. And although there would be questions 
of default and liability, as there are now in traditional firms, there would be no 
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postinsolvency restructuring expense even where the auction of the debtor as a 
going concern were not a viable option. A Chameleon Equity firm would have 
to bear the initial transaction costs of adopting the Chameleon Equity structure. 
But it is difficult to imagine that these costs would be, in the long run, anything 
but trivial additions to the current costs of contracting for corporate charters and 
bond covenants. In short, corporate bankruptcy would appear to be unjustified. 
Even then, I was not so naive as to believe that abolition of bankruptcy or 
firm selection of a Chameleon Equity structure was imminent or even 
possible. In my original paper on Chameleon Equity, I described a list of legal 
and other impediments to a Chameleon Equity structure.13 These include tax, 
commercial, corporate, and tort law.14 I also offered a public choice 
explanation for the persistence of these impediments.15 Nevertheless, in 
principle, a world without debt or bankruptcy and with contractual solutions 
to the collective action problem seemed an efficient world. 
III. THE REAL WORLD 
These proposals for contractual alternatives to bankruptcy were perhaps 
intriguing, and they certainly produced some interesting debates before the 
turn of the new millennium.16 But these academic debates did not, then or 
since, influence policy. Moreover, it was not only legislators who failed to take 
up the call. To my chagrin, despite dizzying financial innovation, debtors and 
investors did not attempt the firm-wide Chameleon Equity structure I 
proposed.17 To be sure, as noted above, I had identified legal impediments to 
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Chameleon Equity, but I became unconvinced that these impediments were 
so formidable as to prevent even attempts at the proposed capital structure if 
that structure were as valuable as I had claimed it might be. 
Perhaps, then, Chameleon Equity or any other contractual alternative to 
corporate bankruptcy is theoretically sound but offers only insignificant 
advantages over even an imperfect, but largely functioning, bankruptcy 
regime such as that of the United States. It could be, therefore, that a 
contractual alternative to resolve the collective action problem would be more 
important elsewhere—in transitional economies, for instance.18 
There is, however, a potentially more fundamental explanation for why 
firms have not attempted to innovate toward a pure Chameleon Equity firm. 
The potential explanation is that threat of liquidation in an asset-grab race by 
dispersed holders of traditional debt may be a solution rather than a problem. 
As I have previously observed,19 there are, theoretically, two approaches 
to corporate insolvency. A system structured according to an ex post approach 
relies on a court-supervised examination of a firm that cannot pay its debts 
in full. If this examination reveals the firm to be viable despite its financial 
distress, the firm restructures its liabilities, or is auctioned as a going concern, 
and continues. Otherwise the firm ceases operation and is liquidated 
piecemeal. Corporate bankruptcy laws in the United States and in other 
countries adopt this approach. Under an alternative, ex ante approach, 
investors would instead abide by the consequences of predictions made at the 
time of investment about a firm’s likely value and attributes should it become 
unable to pay its debts. Unless initial investment contracts provided 
otherwise, a firm’s failure to satisfy its obligations would subject its assets to 
collection without any after-the-fact attempt to determine whether the firm 
were economically viable. Viable firms could be liquidated in the process. But 
such an ex ante approach may be optimal, despite any contrary intuition.20 
A misapprehension of financial economics gives rise to the intuition that 
a proper insolvency system must screen firms that should live from those 
that should die. It is an axiom of finance theory that a firm’s financial 
health—its ability to pay its debts—is not synonymous with the firm’s 
economic health—its ability to provide goods or services efficiently. Thus, if 
insolvency provided no clue as to a firm’s viability, legal rules that permitted 
a firm’s immediate dismemberment at the hands of unconstrained creditors 
might waste much value. But a firm’s insolvency, as signaled by the firm’s 
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20 Id. 
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default on its debt, may provide a strong clue as to the firm’s viability. 
Financial distress need not randomly befall good and bad firms alike. 
Because investors choose an initial capital structure, they may adopt a debt 
component that renders unlikely the simultaneous occurrence of insolvency 
and viability. Consequently, investors might well prefer insolvency rules that 
channel few resources into distinguishing firms that should continue from 
those that should liquidate, even if the result is routine liquidation. 
So perhaps the reason firms do not innovate toward a contractual 
collective insolvency proceeding is that the innovation they’d really like is 
abjuration of a collective proceeding. This is an attractive hypothesis in part 
because there are numerous examples of debtors that attempt to exempt 
individual creditors from the bankruptcy process—borrowing through 
Special Purpose Entities, for example.21 And although we don’t see firms 
attempting to opt out of bankruptcy entirely, this may well be because it 
is, or has been, commonly believed that such an opt-out would not be 
honored under current bankruptcy law, an avowed purpose of which is to 
refinance viable but insolvent debtors. That is, while there may be only 
weak legal barriers to a Chameleon Equity structure, which facilitates 
debtor rescue, there may be an impenetrable barrier or an advanced 
disavowal of such rescue. 
Although this analysis does represent a challenge to the creditors’ bargain 
hypothesis, I have not before described it as such primarily because these 
conclusions rest on what I myself describe as an untestable hypothesis. 
Debtors do not attempt a wholesale opt-out of bankruptcy’s collective 
proceeding. Jacksonians (and perhaps Jackson himself) attribute this to debtor 
satisfaction with collectivization. I attribute the same behavior to apathy 
 
21 In his thoughtful comments at this conference, Ted Janger questioned the relevance of my 
observation that some debtors attempt to exempt some creditors from bankruptcy’s collective 
process. He took a Rawlsian approach to the matter and suggested that while creditors behind a veil 
of ignorance would opt in to collectivization, those whom we see opting out know their place in the 
pecking order and perceive an advantage in doing so. This is an interesting observation but also 
largely inapposite. It is important to keep in mind that the creditors’ bargain is, like the Rawlsian 
veil, only a metaphor. If bankruptcy reflects the creditors’ bargain, then it also reflects the debtors’ 
interests. As noted in the introduction to this Article, in a competitive capital market, creditors are 
mere stakeholders for debtor interests. Truly relevant, then, is the credit-collection regime the 
debtors choose. Consequently, if a debtor attempts to exempt a particular creditor from the 
bankruptcy process, it is the debtor’s choice, not the creditor’s, and such an attempt at exemption is 
an indication that the debtor does not believe collectivization minimizes its cost of capital. This is 
so, at least, if the attempted exemption precedes the issuance of other debt, as may be the situation 
in at least some debtor adoptions of special interest vehicles, for example. In any case, the speculation 
made here is that debtors would, if given the choice, opt out of collectivization from the start, before 
any credit is issued, and while all creditors, prospectively, might be said to be behind the veil of 
ignorance. This is, moreover, how I understand the practitioners’ conjecture on their clients’ desire 
to opt out of bankruptcy, a conjecture described in the introduction. 
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given the perceived futility of action. This is a thin reed—and, as explained 
above, one I’ve relied on before, to my regret. That said, given recent events, 
and for reasons I’ll next address, I’ve now grown (slightly) bolder. 
IV. THE END OF BANKRUPTCY 
In the opening paragraph of a widely read and highly regarded article, 
Douglas Baird and Robert Rasmussen describe a sea change in bankruptcy 
reorganization as that process had been practiced and understood: 
Corporate reorganizations have all but disappeared. Giant corporations make 
headlines when they file for Chapter 11, but they are no longer using it to 
rescue a firm from imminent failure. Many use Chapter 11 merely to sell their 
assets and divide up the proceeds. TWA filed only to consummate the sale of 
its planes and landing gates to American Airlines. Enron’s principal assets, 
including its trading operation and its most valuable pipelines, were sold 
within a few months of its bankruptcy petition. Within weeks of filing for 
Chapter 11, Budget sold most of its assets to the parent company of Avis. 
Similarly, Polaroid entered Chapter 11 and sold most of its assets to the 
private equity group at BankOne. Even when a large firm uses Chapter 11 as 
something other than a convenient auction block, its principal lenders are 
usually already in control and Chapter 11 merely puts in place a preexisting 
deal. Rarely is Chapter 11 a forum where the various stakeholders in a publicly 
held firm negotiate among each other over the firm’s destiny.22 
That article, although written not long after those described in the prior 
sections of this Article, describes a marked transformation in bankruptcy 
reorganization as that process had been practiced and as it had been 
understood at the time of those earlier writings. 
At the risk of oversimplification, what Baird and Rasmussen describe is a 
shift away from a potentially expensive imbroglio over valuation and 
entitlement to a rapid disposition. This disposition may take the form of either 
a free-and-clear sale of the assets to the highest bidder followed by a 
distribution of proceeds down the priority waterfall or, simpler still, a turnover 
of the assets to a united group of lenders whose priority claims would go 
unsatisfied, despite taking all, leaving no valid complaint for downstream 
creditors. One might say, then, that what Baird and Rasmussen describe is not 
so much the end of bankruptcy, but its evolution toward its ideal. 
That bankruptcy has evolved, and is not truly at an end, is significant for 
the purposes of this Article because the changes that Baird and Rasmussen 
describe do not include an elimination of a collective proceeding. In the new 
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world of corporate bankruptcy, there is perhaps little traditional 
reorganization, but assets are held together away from individual creditor 
collection until the court can decide what to do with them. The assets may 
eventually be sold in piecemeal liquidation, as in the examples given by Baird 
and Rasmussen, but they may instead be sold as a going concern if that brings 
the best price. Alternatively, assets are held together until the court can 
determine that the firm belongs to and can be run, or disposed of, by what 
Baird and Rasmussen describe as the “principal creditors.” 
This is not to say that the changes in corporate bankruptcy are irrelevant 
for the question of whether a collective proceeding is desirable; far from it. 
Rather these changes increase the plausibility that collectivization does not, 
in fact, reflect the creditors’ implicit bargain. 
The anecdotal list of liquidations in the Baird and Rasmussen article is 
supported by more formal analysis: in the new world of corporate bankruptcy, 
it is now common even for publicly traded firms to disappear rather than 
continue, in any form or under any ownership, as going concerns.23 So in the 
years since I first speculated in the Chameleon Equity article that corporate 
bankruptcy is unnecessary for a firm with a capital structure designed to 
accommodate insolvency and default, it seems that just such structures have 
arisen, though not in the way I originally imagined. The high liquidation rate 
in bankruptcy, just mentioned, is testament to the fact that by the time 
bankruptcy is available to rescue debtors from the wolves, there may well be 
nothing to rescue. For such firms, the imposition of bankruptcy’s stay on 
individual creditor action may do little more than interfere with and delay the 
redeployment of assets, which creditors could otherwise quickly claim and sell. 
To be sure, not all debtors that enter bankruptcy are worth more dead 
than alive. As noted above, the liquidation of viable debtors, if few enough, 
could be a price worth paying if freedom from bankruptcy’s collective process 
permitted the unhindered liquidation of the rest. But even that price would 
not be as high as may first appear. For the viable debtors, it is important to 
consider the role of “principal creditors.” It is now common, more common 
even than when Baird and Rasmussen wrote, for debtors to enter bankruptcy 
entirely pledged to a senior secured creditor—or a consortium of or trustee 
for such creditors—who will under no circumstances be repaid in full. Under 
principles of absolute priority, such creditors are entitled to the entire firm 
and have an incentive to keep its business afloat should the firm remain 
economically viable despite even a dire financial situation. Presumably, these 
principal creditors—the dominance of which in large part prompted a 
 
23 See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Vedran Capkun & Larry Weiss, Value Destruction in the New Era of Chapter 
11, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 461, 464 (2013) (referring to a collection of empirical studies that support 
anecdotal accounts of a shift toward creditor control and liquidation in bankruptcy proceedings). 
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significant reform effort by the American Bankruptcy Institute24—could be 
expected to assert their property interest ahead of other creditors even 
without bankruptcy intervention,25 which may impede more than protect. 
While Baird and Rasmussen may have been premature in declaring the 
end of corporate bankruptcy, perhaps their title was aspirational, or, at least, 
one can argue that it should have been if the purpose of bankruptcy is to 
prevent a creditor race to assets. 
V. CONCLUSION AND THOUGHTS ON ASSET LAUNDERING 
As noted at the start of this Article, these remarks were prompted by 
conversations at conferences such as the one for which the Article was written. 
In these conversations among academics and practicing lawyers, sophisticated 
practitioners gave the impression or stated outright that investors would, if they 
could, forswear the bankruptcy process. And my hope is that what I’ve written 
here will provoke a more focused consideration of that prospect. 
Before concluding, though, I want to add another topic to the mix—an idea 
also prompted by conversation among academics and practitioners. Although 
there may be an implicit consensus that lenders are not particularly interested 
in forced collectivization, there is apparently a strong interest in another aspect 
of the bankruptcy process: free-and-clear dispositions. Without the cleansing 
available by a sale of assets through bankruptcy, or a discharge upon Chapter 11 
plan confirmation, purchasers or creditors are at risk that state law actions will 
follow assets into the hands of a solvent entity.26 This prospect would be 
unwelcome as well as unwise if the disposition of assets from an insolvent 
debtor failed to cure the insolvency problem, requiring another disposition, and 
so on. And the prospect would be unwelcome to some creditors, though not 
necessarily unwise, if it effectively elevated the priority of these asset-following 
 
24 See AM. BANKR. INST., AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE 
REFORM OF CHAPTER 11 OF THE U.S. BANKRUPTCY CODE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
214-24 (2014) (“Throughout their deliberations, the Commissioners held lengthy and thoughtful 
discussions concerning the rights of senior creditors in bankruptcy and how best to balance these rights 
with the reorganization needs of the debtor and the interests of other stakeholders.”). 
25 It is sometimes claimed that the bankruptcy process is necessary for a secured creditor to 
enforce a blanket lien on all assets, including the debtor’s going-concern value. One might wonder 
whether a creditor who claims a blanket lien in bankruptcy should prevail if the claimed interest is 
unenforceable under state law. Even if a blanket lien is both legitimate and unenforceable under 
state law, it is not the classic Jacksonian collectivity function that is served when bankruptcy enforces 
such a lien in competition with junior creditors who, as a result of the lien, lack any claim to the 
debtor’s assets. Put another way, adjudication of the winner in a grab race is not the same function 
as elimination of that race. And although an adjudication of a lien’s validity prior to bankruptcy or 
state foreclosure proceedings entails a temporary suspension of asset distribution, such interference 
with creditor collection could be minimal. 
26 See supra note 25. 
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claims, which may be nonconsensual and thus entitled under nonbankruptcy 
law to no special priority. 27 
So corporate bankruptcy may be desirable after all, even today. But 
bankruptcy’s principal function may be asset laundering, not collectivization, 
the brilliant Jacksonian paradigm notwithstanding. 
 
27 See supra note 10. 
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